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SZAKDOLGOZAT

HUXLEY'S *EYELESS IN GAZA*: THE ROLE OF TIME AND NARRATIVE IN THE DEPICTION OF PERSONALITY

HUXLEY *VAK SÁMSON*JA: AZ IDŐ ÉS AZ ELBESZÉLÉS SZEREPE A SZEMÉLYISÉG-ÁBRÁZOLÁSBAN

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Nyilatkozat

Alulírott ....

Kijelentem, hogy a szakdolgozat saját szellemi termékem.

Budapest, 2009.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

Aldous Huxley's fifth novel, *Eyeless in Gaza* was published in 1936. The year is of great importance, considering the events of Huxley's life and the political-ideological climate of the 1930s. As for Huxley, he had already converted to pacifism and many critics see his career as a novelist (at least as a good one) coming to an end in 1936. On a global level, the world was at a temporary peace: a peace between two great wars. The traumas of the First World War were near past, the crisis produced by The Great Depression had just ended. The rising danger in Germany was almost tangible. Because Huxley was always conscious about his circumstances, his place in the world, it would be in vain to try and separate his story from humanity's. In 1936, the Spanish Civil War broke out, and, on the very same night, *Eyeless in Gaza* was published.[1]

From a more intellectual perspective, the great modernist revolution of the arts was at an end after the 1920s. In literature, James Joyce's *Ulysses* was published in 1922, Virgina Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* had appeared in 1925, Marcel Proust had completed his opus *À la recherche du temps perdu* (*In Search of Lost Time*) by 1927, and William Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* was out in 1929. Theoretically, the overwhelmingly great problem of time is as old as philosophy itself. The modern approaches to the problem of time from Bergson and Husserl to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) in 1927 were already influencing the intellectual climate in the late 1930s. The genre of the novel was even seen as a form of writing that "conceptualizes time".[2] The challenge against the "conventional

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[1] George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 15.

[2] Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction – An Introduction* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 88.

temporal order"[3] was a commonplace idea by 1930 and the scientific paradigm-shift of Einstein was widely accepted.

The ideological and artistic ebullience of modernism had an ambiguous effect on the period after its peak in the 1920s. We might suppose that it was an inspiration but as an inspiration it was too strong. The main question could have been: "is there anything left to discover?" British writers turned to politics and the questions of commitment and responsibility.[4] The same relocation of emphasis can be seen in the rising Existentialist movement in France: Sartre started to publish his first works by the end of the 30s and Camus's *L'Étranger* appeared in 1942. As for Huxley, his early satirical novels are usually praised because they paint an accurate picture of the intellectual atmosphere of the 1920s.[5] However, when the deadly satirist chose to take the path of pacifism and mysticism, he even lost his ground for this, we might say, false praise.[6] This observation is usually followed by the one that after (and even *in*) *Eyeless in Gaza*[7] Huxley took his intellectualizing tendencies too far and thus the 'novel of ideas' started losing its 'novel' part.[8]

This paper below argues that EG is not a pseudo-novel, and does not contain seeds of artistic dissolution. It is one of the paper's aims to question the notion of 'the novel of ideas' and its theoretical implications and conditions. To accomplish this, a more detailed outline of modernist problems and EG's position is given in the second chapter, with special attention paid to the relation of art and life including the notions of mimesis and representation. The

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[3] Ibid, 109.

[4] Ibid, 203.

[5] Frederick J. Hoffman, "Aldous Huxley and the Novel of Ideas," *College English*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Dec., 1946): 137.

[6] For example, Jerome Meckier cites two unfortunate praises: one is that Huxley personifies his age, and the other is that it is a liberating experience to read him. Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), i.

[7] Abbreviated as 'EG' in the rest of the paper.

[8] Unfortunately, Meckier, after brilliant examinations, falls into this trap as well. He says about *Eyeless in Gaza* that it contains "the seeds of Huxley's dissolution as a novelist" and that "[i]ntellectualizing the novel can go too far." Ibid, 159. In addition, he is not the only one: cf. George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 20-22 and Hoffmann, "Aldous Huxley and the Novel of Ideas," *College English*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Dec., 1946): 136.

status and qualities of the modern novel are considered, especially from the viewpoint of narrative and narrative theory. The third chapter deals with the text of EG more closely and tries to explain how the protagonist struggles with his identity throughout the novel's strangely structured time-frame which is not only a form forced upon its content but itself a way of meaning-creation.[9] The fourth and last chapter before our conclusion tries to identify some breaking-points in the fabric of this – seemingly coherent, as it will be shown – context and framework and, in this way, sets out to prove that the main virtue of Huxley's novel lies not in its certain and impressively cohesive artistic accomplishment but in its uncertainties. It argues that the ambiguity of the ending, of the conversion of Anthony and of the character of Miller is so strong that we have to overwrite our previous and, in a way, oversimplified conceptions. It is not about the fictive creation of personality but about metafictive reflections on it and the fragmentation that overrides the certainty of these constructions. The primary task is to show EG never transcends the unsettling tension of oppositions such as continuity and discontinuity, eternity and change, wholeness and partiality, identity and alterity, etc but, closely read, sustains itself in this tension. If, along these lines, we consider recent theories about textuality, reader-writer relationship, and about interpretation, we might be tempted to think of EG as a valuable entry into this gigantic discourse of modernism and postmodernism and as a better novel than as the traditional canon evaluates it.

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[9] On the impossibility of separation of form and content (which has its roots in Symbolism and Romanticism) see David Lodge, *Language of Fiction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2nd ed. 1984), 28-29.

II.

HUXLEY'S NARRATIVE IN A MODERNIST CONTEXT

> *„Literature is also philosophy, is also science.*
>
> *In terms of beauty it enunciates truths."*[10]

This chapter is an attempt at placing EG in the discourse of modernism, focusing on central themes like truth, art, beauty and reality. Many critics are preoccupied by the problem of representation and mimesis when it comes to fiction.[11] Of course, with literature, the underlying question is a question of language. To summarize: how are words able to stand for a reality outside them? Novels are particularly sensitive to this problem because traditionally they are said to be stories about our everyday life. This is the cornerstone of realist fiction. However, with modernism, the norm, reality itself was questioned.[12] With the 'stream of consciousness' technique, for example, we can see that writers were looking for new realities, not only new forms of expression. This phenomenon brings us to the paradigm of *creation* instead of representation which has its roots in Romanticism. David Lodge reminds us that by reading (modernist or non-modernist) novels "we enter into a unique linguistic universe".[13] Northrop Frye says that literature is similar to mathematics in this respect: they are both

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[10] Aldous Huxley, "Vulgarity in Literature," in *Collected Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), 110.

[11] Eg. Huxley's critics: "Ultimate Reality cannot be expressed in art." John Atkins, *Aldous Huxley – A Literary Study* (London: John Calder, 1956), 123 and George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley*. London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 177. And, in general, many theorists: cf. Roland Barthes, *A szöveg öröme – Irodalomelméleti írások* (Budapest: Osiris kiadó, 1998), 6. Jeremy Hawthorne, *Studying the Novel* (London: Hodder Education, 5th ed. 2005), 127. Elizabeth Wright, *Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice* (London and New York: Routledge, 1985), 46. Paul Ricoeur, "Narrated Time," *Philosophy Today* Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1985): 259-272. David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), 13-14. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism – Four Essays* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 354.

[12] "Modernist fiction changed radically because the world it envisaged changed radically." Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction – An Introduction* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 6 and "New speeds and new pace of life created new experience along the fundamental coordinates of space and time." Ibid, 10.

[13] David Lodge, *Language of Fiction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2nd ed. 1984), 69.

languages and they can not represent truth although they can be tools for expressing them.[14]

This brings us to a new problem: how the worlds that are created in literature relate to our world of experience?

Aesthetically, the status of a work of art is not clear in the terms of the epistemological subject-object opposition, neither in terms of reality and unreality.[15] Language is in between the speaking subject and the world it refers (or is taken to refer) to. A 'unique linguistic universe' means that the traditional ties between signifier and the signified are somehow severed. Connecting this consideration with the one about representations, it is now understandable why many theorists think that works of literature belong to the dimension determined by the modalities of potentiality and hypothesis. If we agree with Ricoeur that the meaning of a work of fiction arises in a cutaway section belonging to both text's world and the listener's or reader's world,[16] then we are able to phrase the problem in a more distinguished way: how is a work of fiction able to 'penetrate' the reader's world and create a joint space between the reader's world of experience and its own? The attempt at answering this question in the case of novels starts with deliberations about time and narrative.

"Literature, as all art, can be (and has always been) regarded as a laboratory in which possible human realities can be imagined and tested. The laboratory idea is linked to the view of narrative as a model of the world."[17] For Brockmeier and Harré, the importance of possible human realities and of the narrative model is connected. From this point of view, the world of fiction is a possible human world created by a story. Narrative is an ordering of time, the fictive possible worlds are created by articulating a possible time-experience which means

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[14] Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism – Four Essays* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 354.

[15] Frye says works of literature are on a border of the antithesis of being and non-being. Literature and mathematics are both pure but they can be applied to reality. Ibid, 351.

[16] Paul Ricoeur, "A szöveg világa és az olvasó világa," in *Narratívák 2. – Történet és fikció*, ed. Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 1998), 11.

[17] Jens Brockmeier and Rom Harré, "Narrative: problems and promises of a alternative paradigm," in *Narrative and Identity – Studies in Autobiography, Self and Culture*, ed. Jens Brockmeier, Donal Carbaugh (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: The John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001), 54.

that time is one of the most essential factors, both to fiction and to human reality. The essentiality of time is even more apparent in modernist literature. The 'demon', that haunted the modernist quest for a new and more authentic time-conception was the "time on the clock".[18] Writers were struggling to find new ways of 'conceptualizing time' and 20th century, fiction has become a place "in which a new experience of time has been rehearsed, developed and expressed."[19] The techniques of – using Mieke Bal's expressions – 'retroversion' and 'anticipation' were almost abused.[20] The treatment of the fabula, the configuration of events and the experiments with the time of the story and the time of narration are just a few examples of the obsessive attitude that modernism had towards the time experience.

It is easy to see the reason why the novel is a favored genre of these experiments with time. The novel is the distinguished form of narrative in modernism and, for example, Ricoeur's article, "Narrative Time" – and many of his works, in general - is a demonstration of the ways narrative and time belong together.[21] Ricoeur draws on the tradition of philosophy that Bergson's, Husserl's and Heidegger's writings created, and which treats time and temporality as prime dimensions of human existence. Most importantly, concerning fiction, Ricoeur sets up a 'category' of "stories about time", mentioning many novels from the 1920s. These are the stories that project "an experience in which time as such is thematized."[22] Noticing that fiction share the same tenses with memory and historiography, Ricoeur outlines

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[18] Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction – An Introduction* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 85, 124.

[19] Mark Currie, *About Time – Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 6. Also cf. Paul Ricoeur, "Narrated Time." *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1985): 268.

[20] Mieke Bal, *Narratology – Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (Toronto-Buffalo-London: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 54.

[21] Eg. Ricoeur says that narrative presents a paradox, the "authenticity of its inauthenticity" because it helps in taking time "for granted" but, at the same time, it states the truth of Heideggerian within-time-ness. Paul Ricoeur, "Narrative Time," *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn, 1980): 175.

[22] Paul Ricoeur, "Narrated Time." *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1985): 268. Or, differently put: "Fiction, in this sense, always has a secret about time, a knowledge which necessarily lies beneath the surface, and yet which also refuses the very idea of surface and depth which the notion of fictional knowledge offers." Mark Currie, *About Time – Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 136.

their common origin in the phenomenology of time and calls it "human time".[23] What this means for our purposes is that the previously mentioned intersection between the reader's world and the text's world is based on the common time experience that manifests itself in the narration.

EG is a great example for anyone interested in the narrative construction of identity. Jerome Meckier says that it is the most multiple *Bildungsroman* written in English.[24] If we leave aside the issue of the actual "*Bildung*" or development, we can agree that EG is in fact very rich in the stories of characters. We certainly know nearly the whole life of Anthony Beavis until his age of 43. We spot Helen at first in her mother's, Mary Amberly's womb at the funeral of Anthony's mother. We know Brian from the boarding school until his suicide and another classmate, Mark Staithes until 1934. We can follow Hugh Ledwidge from his humiliation at the boarding school to his marriage with Helen. This fact in itself is an argument against the notion of 'the novel of ideas' because one would have to present quite a far-fledged interpretation labeling EG a 'morality play' that has 'ideas' on stage and following the lives of different ideas from childhood for 30 years. Despite this, Hoffman says that Huxley demonstrates that ideas can have qualities comparable to persons.[25] According to this, Huxley would stage the drama and stories of ideas. But how would we know that we are dealing with an idea and not a person? This question is not as easily answered as it seems at first. Samantha Vice describes the irreducible individuality of persons, and writes: "Characters that move us the most, that we care about most deeply, are those that transcend their role in the plot, that break into personhood despite the artifice of their world."[26] Without arguing with the anthropological implications, the questions can be reframed now: do Huxley's characters "transcend their role in the plot"?

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[23] Ibid, 271.
[24] Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 151.
[25] Frederick J. Hoffman, "Aldous Huxley and the Novel of Ideas," *College English*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Dec., 1946): 130.
[26] Samantha Vice, "Literature and the Narrative Self," *Philosophy* Vol. 48, No. 303 (Jan, 2003): 108.

Unfortunately, it is not simple to determine whether characters can transcend their role or not. It might even be contradictory to the narrative construction of identity. If a character's identity is determined by the plot, told in the narrative, how do we expect role-transcendence? Moreover, as John Atkins tells us: "More than any other contemporary novelist [Huxley] takes in the whole range of the individual's life, from birth to death."[27] In addition, narratives are largely – if not completely – ruled by cultural and social conventions.[28] From another aspect, the creation of narrative includes systematic choice between relevant and irrelevant events, a hierarchy of importance that works through omissions and repetitions, for example. Roland Barthes thinks that a novel is a product of the citizenry's universality-myth. Our narrative past is for the security of society, it is an "image of order."[29] Conventional morality strongly influences the ways we are able to narrate. Frank Kermode genealogically corroborates this: „the rise of what we call literary fiction happened at a time when the revealed, authenticated account of the beginning was losing its authority."[30] Rephrased for our purposes, this means that narrative can be seen as supplement for moral origins, and thus always determined by conventional morality.

These hardships indicate that the question itself might be wrong. Do persons have irreducible individuality? Huxley even criticized the modern novel's point of view for being too individual and partial.[31] So even if the answer is yes, it will not mean that characters must resemble them, the relationship of life and literature is more complex than that. Huxley is often accused of – besides being too 'intellectual' – strong didactic tendencies.[32] His novels are seen as teachings, rather than artistic games. Is such a claim justified? This paper agrees

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[27] John Atkins, *Aldous Huxley – A Literary Study* (London: John Calder, 1956), 52. He even reminds us, that Huxley did not live with his creatures like Dostoevsky, he distanced himself from them. Ibid, 37.

[28] Kenneth J. Gergen and Mary M. Gergen, "A narratívumok és az én mint viszonyrendszer," in *Narratívák 5. – Narratív pszichológia*, ed. László János, Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 2001), 102.

[29] Roland Barthes, *A szöveg öröme - irodalomelméleti írások* (Budapest: Osiris kiadó, 1998), 20.

[30] Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending – Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 56.

[31] Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 58.

[32] Eg. George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 61-62.

with Roland Barthes's argument, that writing cancels every origin and every fiction of authorial authority. Literature, according to him, is a mask that is needed to bear the burden of honesty and it is also the metafictional gesture of pointing to this paradoxical situation.[33] Huxley's 'teachings' are interpretable in this light not as authorial enunciations but problematic texts, questioning the status of a work of art. When Ricoeur says that a text has a mimetic relation to the real, aiming at it indirectly, aiming at a possible world, it contains our paradox: "an outside intended by an inside."[34] If "modernist fiction lost touch with the real world", as it is often accused to have done,[35] or if it is "discontinuous with real life",[36] we have the chance to take advantage of it, to embrace what Huxley calls the "super-truth" of good fiction.[37]

This "super-truth" for characters means, and is analyzed here as, narrative creation of possible personalities that actually tell the reader more about him or herself than a badly written biography. Narrative is the main site for the conditions of the mutual imitations of art and life.[38] Of course, interpreting this kind of fiction demands more work and collaboration from the reader as well. Following Marie-Laure Ryan, Dannenberg suggests that "immersion" is a more useful concept than "realism" to describe the narrative phenomena that accompanied the rise of the modern novel."[39] This is also a way to approach the "writerly texts" of Roland Barthes. Below this essay tries to show that the personalities created by Huxley's narrative and extraordinary time-structure in EG are perfect for triggering immersion and collaboration on the reader's part.

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[33] Roland Barthes, *A szöveg öröme - irodalomelméleti írások* (Budapest: Osiris kiadó, 1998), 20-24.
[34] Paul Ricoeur, "Narrated Time," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1985): 268.
[35] Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction – An Introduction* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 213.
[36] David Lodge, *Language of Fiction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2nd ed. 1984), 42.
[37] Aldous Huxley, "Tragedy and the Whole Truth," in *Collected Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), 97.
[38] Anthony Paul, Kerby, *Narrative and the Self* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 55. Cf. "a művészet olyan közeggé válik, amelyen keresztül az élet realitása megteremtődik." Kenneth J. Gergen and Mary M. Gergen, "A narratívumok és az én mint viszonyrendszer," in *Narratívák 5. – Narratív pszichológia*, ed. László János, Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 2001), 78.
[39] Hilary P. Dannenberg, *Coincidence and Counterfactuality – Plotting Time and Space in Narrative Fiction* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 5.

III.

UNITY AND IDENTITY

"Life and all being are one." (EG, LIV, 498.)

EG can be and was seen as a didactic novel, a novel of teachings, which disproves Anthony Beavis's theory of the discontinuity of the self.[40] "What right had the man of 1914 to commit the man of 1926?" – Anthony asks himself (EG, XII, 121.) His main theory is that personality is not stable, persons are just series of states which have nothing in common. The narrative refutes this, seems to move from Anthony's detachment to commitment, from intellectual escapism to responsibility, from fragmentation to unity and from egoism to selflessness. The novel begins with the protagonist in 1933 and ends with him in 1935. The chapters that come in between could explain the change, one might even say 'redemption' Anthony goes through in 1934 when he meets Miller, the mysterious pacifist, the doctor in Mexico.[41] In the end, in the last chapter Anthony realizes that every separate and individual being is one in a deep unity of existence. This tension is the philosophical ground for pacifism and mysticism and this is the proof of conversion, the product of the "*Bildung*", and the refutation of Anthony's earlier views.

According to Jeremy Hawthorne, the "*Bildungsroman*" is held together by the personality of the central figure.[42] Who is then Anthony Beavis? That is what the reader should learn from the narrative of EG. EG can, in fact, be seen as a demonstration of the narrative identity thesis: our identities, who we are, our personality is 'readable' from the stories we tell about

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[40] George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 198.

[41] Cf. Ibid, 61.

[42] Jeremy Hawthorne, *Studying the Novel* (London: Hodder Education, 5th ed. 2005), 116.

ourselves.[43] In the EG's case, it is another kind of demonstration: Anthony's identity is discoverable from the story told about him. Anthony is the one who buries his mother in 1902 and has to grow up without her. He is the friend of Brian Foxe, a boy from school with whom he goes to university together. Anthony is the one who starts an affair with an older lady, Mary Amberley, who later challenges him to betray his friend, Brian Foxe. Anthony is thus the main cause of his friend's suicide. When Mary Amberley is overwhelmed by her addiction to morphine, Anthony betrays her too and a couple of years later he starts an affair with her daughter, Helen. The affair could not last long: Anthony cannot commit himself and this drives Helen away. After this, his other friend from school, Mark Staithes persuades Anthony to accompany him for a trip to Mexico. Anthony is the one who meets Miller, the mysterious doctor in Mexico, who helps him save Mark and converts to Miller's teachings. Anthony, in the end, is the one who faces the dangers of a threat he received in advance of a public, pacifist speech.

Of course, this is just a linearized outline of the events. During the novel, as Anthony is struggling to make sense of them, the reader is encouraged to do so as well. The fragmented and achronic time structure of the novel could be seen as a guideline, using Wittgenstein's famous expression: the ladder that should be thrown away once we climbed up on it. However, while we need "the ladder", we might as well examine its sense-making procedures.[44]

EG has four main timelines: the first one covers the time from the funeral of Anthony's mother in 1902 to 1904, the meal with Anthony's father and his new wife, Pauline. The

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[43] A strong form of this thesis for example: "az emberi életek maguk is narratív események" Kenneth J. Gergen and Mary M. Gergen. "A narratívumok és az én mint viszonyrendszer." in *Narratívák 5. – Narratív pszichológia*, ed. László János, Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 2001), 78.

[44] "the meaning and significance of experience often emerge or are transformed in retrospect, when that experience assumes its place as an episode in an evolving narrative." Mark Freeman, „Rethinking the Fictive, Reclaiming the Real: Autobiography, Narrative Time, and the Burden of Truth," in *Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the Brain*, ed. Gary D. Fireman, Ted E. McVay, Jr., Owen J. Flanagan (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 123.

second lasts from 1912, the Eton years of Anthony, Mark and Brian until 1914, Brian's suicide. The third basically consists of the party at Mary Amberley's place in 1926 and the last episode is in 1931, the year when Anthony asked Helen (already the wife of Hugo Ledwidge) out to dinner. The fourth takes up more than the half of the novel (28 chapters to be exact) and depicts the events of 1933, Anthony's break-up with Helen, Anthony's trip to Mexico with Mark, Anthony's diary entries and the last Chapter that is dated February 23rd, 1935. These timelines themselves are linear, therefore we cannot pronounce the novel overly experimental: the experiment lies in their fragmentation and combination. The way each line is interrupted by another depicts a chaos, a chaos of the mind. On the other hand, the dating of each chapter and the dramatic configuration of events (for example, the suicide of Brian is first hinted at in Chapter III and is only shown in Chapter LII) suggests an order, an order not visible and not obvious on the surface.

"The thirty-five years of his conscious life made themselves immediately known to him as a chaos – a pack of snapshots in the hands of a lunatic." (EG, III, 18.) – this is Anthony in 1933 after a seemingly random remembrance of his friend, Brian's suicide, triggered by the odour of his lover's skin in the sunshine. This is a perfect example of the sense-making procedures and paradigmatic for the structure of the novel itself. The connections in EG are not ordinary: they seem to be chaotic because they do not follow the cause and effect order of the ordinary timeline. Acknowledging the mentioned modernist "hostility" to clock-time and the need for a compensating, meaningful and subjective experience in the modern world of the late-capitalist society are manifestly present here. Memory is indeed a way to provide a new timeframe and new possibilities apart from the mechanical succession of a clock's ticking which is paradigmatic for the industrialized society.[45] The structure of EG mirrors this central position of individualized, experimental conception of time.

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[45] Cf. Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction – An Introduction* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 15, 78, 93.

At first glance, the correlative conception of personality seems like the one without a central core, as John Atkins says: "There are no personalities in this world, whether Huxley's or our own, but only states."[46] However, this is illusory and the interpretation falls into the trap of Anthony's "self-justifying fiction".[47] Anthony has his own conception of personality that he plans to develop in his *Elements of Sociology*: "And why do we imagine that we have coherent experiences and personality? Because our minds work slowly and have very feeble powers of analysis." (EG, XI, 112-113.) Huxley, in this light, is a master of deception: he makes the reader think, for a large part of the book, that the fiction of Anthony, the protagonist is one with the fiction of the implied author.[48]

On the contrary, the narrative's extraordinary structure and the jumps in time emphasize connections and coherence that are deeper than our ordinary consciousness, our ordinary, linear time-conception recognizes.[49] George Woodcock describes this time structure comparing it to Cubist techniques instead of Dadaist dislocation: this structure makes us see new – we might add: types of - connections. It is an organic form in which the past and present constantly illuminate each other.[50] Each chapter begins with a canonized, seemingly objective time reference which supports Huxley's condemnation of super-individualized experience.[51] Supporting and explaining the narrative technique that merges linear timelines with fragmented structure, three interrelated thematic connections are examined here which explain how Anthony became who he is, how he acquired his detachment, his intellectual position that, in the end, only compensates for his cowardice and that he is unable to take

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[46] John Atkins, *Aldous Huxley – A Literary Study* (London: John Calder, 1956), 105.

[47] Jerry Wasserman, "Huxley's Either/Or: The Case for *Eyeless in Gaza*," *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction*, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1980): 191.

[48] Novels can suggest that they have a medium-less narrative: Cf. Jeremy Hawthorne, *Studying the Novel* (London: Hodder Education, 5th ed. 2005), 86.

[49] "Huxley demonstrates the human necessity for transcending time" James H. Quina, Jr. "The Philosophical Phases of Aldous Huxley," *College English*, Vol. 23, No. 8. (May, 1962): 636. In our view, it is not transcending time itself but the ordinary, linear, clock-time.

[50] George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 199-204.

[51] On the abuse of stream of consciousness technique and unrealized dialogical possibilities see Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 59.

responsibility: first, the loss of his mother, second, his betrayal of his friend, Brian, third, his love affair with Helen Ledwidge.

The early death of Anthony's mother (which is also a autobiographical element) sets the narrative in motion. The novel begins with Anthony, looking at a snapshot of his mother (EG, I, 1.) "[M]y old corpses." – Anthony explains the snapshots to Helen, setting the tone of detachment from the past which is declared dead. (EG, I, 4.) This scene gathers its significance three chapters later, when we see Anthony, his father and Uncle James travelling to the funeral of Anthony's mother in 1902, 31 years before the scene with Helen. The funeral is also a social event, at which Helen is present too, in her mother, Mary Amberley's womb who is part of the Champernownes family. Anthony, the "[p]oor, motherless child", as his father thinks of him (EG, IV, 28.), is destined to be haunted by his mother for the rest of his life: his mother's saying, "[r]eeking with germs" (EG, IV, 29.) and the contrast between his mother's beauty and his humiliation in ice skating (EG, IV, 31.) forms the basis of Anthony's detachment from the bodily world and his introverted self. This "loss of innocence", according to Woodcock, makes Anthony blind (as Huxley struggled with physical blindness in his life) because he stares into "the horror and absurdity of existence".[52]

The social dimension and effect of the death is further exaggerated by Anthony's changed status in the Bulstrode school, after he returns from the funeral. The school scenes contain the seeds from which the other half of Anthony's later connections grows out. The mood is set by the awkward attempts of Anthony's father to establish a bond and intimacy. In turn, he just worsens the traumatic event ("She'll never be dead for us.") and his "colloquialism" (the awkward bonding attempt of his slangy expressions like "chums"), makes Anthony feel ashamed: "He was in an agony of shame and embarrassment." (EG, VI, 46.) Afterwards, at Bulstrode, Anthony has to experience being an outsider, detachment from his social milieu:

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[52] George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 36-38.

"At school everyone was frightfully decent. […] Never, since the first days of his first term, had he felt so hopelessly out of it all as he felt that evening." (EG, VI, 47.)

Chronologically speaking, the cycle of Anthony's betrayals begins here. Brian Foxe, the stammering 'Horse-Face' is the only one who does not adopt the distanced sham-sympathy that all the boys handle Anthony with. Anthony 'repays him', following the masturbation-incident of Hugh (Goggler) Ledwidge, by taking Mark Staithes's side in the argument in which Brian represents the moral decision: to protect Hugh against the majority. The second is two betrayals: one is a repeated event at school, Anthony always laughs with the other boys who ridicule Brian's love for birds (EG, IX, 84.) and, in the same manner, he laughs with Mrs. Foxe's patronized "cripples" at Brian's stammer: "When they laughed at Brian for his stammer, he [Anthony] laughed with them […]." (EG, IX, 89.) The third betrayal happens at Eton, where Anthony, who is supposed to go to a meeting of the Fabians where Brian would present a speech on syndicalism but goes to a dinner with the 'aristocrats', the crew of Gerry Watchett. The fourth and major betrayal is Anthony's seduction of Joan Thursley, Brian's girlfriend.

To examine this major betrayal in more detail, it must be remembered that many storylines intersect, many characters come together to enact this tragic event. First, the death of Anthony's mother – to employ character psychoanalysis – makes him vulnerable to the seduction of Mary Amberley, a much older 'femme fatale'. Mary Amberley becomes an oedipal mother-figure for Anthony and, in turn, is able to push him into betraying his friend just "out of sheer perversity" – as she later puts it regretfully (EG, XXXIV, 357.) Mary Amberley and Anthony make a bet. The second line is Joan's relationship with Brian. This relationship is doomed by Brian's fatherlessness, his – again an oedipal motive – affection for his mother, Mrs. Foxe, who, of course, expects and returns it. This might be the cause of

Brian's aversion towards the bodily realm and instincts.[53] The third line is, naturally, the friendship of Anthony and Brian. Anthony aggravates the betrayal by being unable to claim responsibility and confess to Brian who is driven to suicide by Joan's letter.[54] The personalities, as we can see, that are partly revealed enter into a sort of 'dialogue' and enact the important crises and events.[55] This partial exposure is enough to make the reader infer the end and to call attention to the depiction of personality. This can be witnessed easily in the end of the affair between Anthony and Helen. The suicide of Brian is the major event in Anthony's life besides his mother's death: he struggles with it from 1914 until his redemption and betrays Mary Amberley when she is in need of help because of her morphine-addiction and financial straits and betrays Helen's love.

Of course, despite every criticism Huxley employs against Freud, the loss of the mother sets a pattern for Anthony's love-life too. The most important aspect can be seen in his affair with Helen, whose "horror of her body" repeatedly manifests through the stories about the kidney (EG, V.), about the dog crashing to Anthony's roof (EG, XII.), about the death of her cat (EG, XXIV.) and about her abortion (EG, XXXIX.)[56] Huxley's method of time-configuration pictures their relationship as a machinery pre-determined by the past: the

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[53] A perfect example is in Chapter X, Anthony mentions 'going to bed', Brian: "disliked this sort of conversation, disliked it more than ever now that he was in love with Joan – in love, and yet (he hated himself for it) desiring her basely, wrongly…" EG, X, 97. This self-hate manifests later, after he kisses Joan in the forest (the ancient symbol of animalistic instincts and nature) and is the cause of Joan's falling for Anthony's seduction. EG, XIX, 209-210.

[54] The bet takes place in Chapter XXVII, the seduction in Chapter XXXIII. Anthony travels to Brian to confess in Chapter XXXVI, he is unable to tell him in Chapter XLIII, Brian receives Joan's letter in Chapter XLIX and Brian is found dead in Chapter LII.

[55] "Huxley is not concerned with showing 'the slow development of personality', but wants to focus our attention on a crisis, psychological and moral, leading to a conversion; his vision is not evolutionary but climactic or mutative. And the second idea is that the technique is not imposed on the story from outside as a clever device, but consistent with, and indeed evolved from, Huxley's conception of time, consciousness, and change." Pierre Vitoux, "Structure and Meaning in Aldous Huxley's *Eyeless in Gaza*," *The Yearbook of English Studies,* Vol. 2. (1972): 213.

[56] About preoccupation with the body: Cf. John Atkins, *Aldous Huxley – A Literary Study* (London: John Calder, 1956), 70. George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley*. London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 16. Body as chaotic principle: Jerry Wasserman, "Huxley's Either/Or: The Case for *Eyeless in Gaza*," *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction*, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1980): 193.

mechanics behind the scene in the first chapter are continuously revealed, setting the stage for the break-up after the dog-incident.

Anthony, the detached intellectual full of guilt, and Helen, a young girl with a morphine-addicted mother, after an abortion and an awful marriage come together and decide on the strategy of "no fuss" (EG, I, 4. Anthony agrees with Helen's mother on the pointlessness of "fuss" as early as 1927, although Mary Amberley starts to feel differently in connection with her lover, Gerry Watchett. EG, XXIV, 272.) This is beneficial for both of them, since they do not have to face reality and the responsibilities of a 'real' relationship. For Helen, Anthony is a complete opposite of the invisibly loving Hugh Ledwidge: Anthony wants to be solely visible to her, without depths ("Just a bit of fun." EG, I, 5.) While Hugh is not able to be present in his relationship with Helen, at all, Anthony is just simply present, mainly in a bodily and sexual sense that, in consequence, renders the relationship meaningless. Anthony's simple presence is supported by the scene when, in turn, a simple presence of the body betrays him. His mind associates in a moment of analepsis from Helen's Gaugain-esque impression to his time with Helen's mother, Mary Amberley in Paris and then the woman's body in the sunshine betrays him further: his mind jumps in an instance of analepsis to the dead body of his friend, Brian (EG, III, 17-19.) It is to be remembered, the reader at this point is still at the beginning of the book. Even this early, Anthony can be seen as struggling with his conscious identity, his detachment. Reality, real events intrude and confuse him. In Chapter XII, his relationship with Helen is tested by the dog's body crashing onto the roof and, with their naked bodies covered in blood, something unimaginable but real such as this incident is able to drive Helen away and push Anthony to question himself, as the critic Jerry Wasserman observes:

> "In the days following the dog's fall Anthony begins to see through his own
> fictions for the first time. Like Milton's Samson Agonistes in the soliloquy

from which Huxley took his title, Anthony becomes willing to admit that his blindness and bondage may be his own fault."[57]

Above, it becomes understandable how the novel depicts Anthony's personality, offering a narrative identity that is actually truer, more adequate than his own conception of personality and himself. In order to accomplish this, Huxley deceives the reader, shaping as he does the novel's narrative to imitate Anthony's theory, only in order to show its weaknesses, which results in beating Anthony's theory on its own ground. This would not have been possible with an ordinarily chronological narrative. The effectiveness of the fragmentation and combination lies in its ability to hold the reader in a tension, to offer a situation (for example Helen's theft of the kidney in Chapter V) and to save the explanation for later (the abortion in Chapter XXXIX). This brings the narrative sense-making techniques in focus. The situations do not make sense at first: the reader has to engage in questioning the narrative to discover the meaning, constructed by the very same narrative. In an ordinarily chronological narrative, the development of events would seem too natural thus the reader would not have to actively participate. Of course, "in every plot there is an escape from chronicity"[58] and in Frank Kermode's words, who argues that the narrative constructions replace pure and empty successiveness with meaning in the end.[59] This is not a new development in the modern novel: however, Huxley's novel with its extraordinary handling of time stimulates the reader more effectively than a linear timeline would.

Therefore the reader goes through the fragmented time and the narrative, jumping from one linear timeline to another, finding out how Anthony is changed, saved in the end. For example his former, abstract world of thoughts is unveiled as cowardice and instead of purity it is will to power used in a wrong way: "I used to think I had no will to power. Now I

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[57] Jerry Wasserman, "Huxley's Either/Or: The Case for *Eyeless in Gaza*," *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction*, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1980): 193.
[58] Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending – Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 50.
[59] Ibid, 46.

perceive that I vented it on thoughts, rather than people." (EG, XIII, 138.) The narrative and our interpretation go from unconscious self-deception through an epiphany to the realization of the true self. It is described by Wasserman: "The self exists in disparate forms at different moments; but ultimately it is the same self. We work at sorting out the book just as Anthony struggles to resolve the chaos of his life." [60] Anthony's diary is the document, the proof of change. One of the most important aspects of change is the way he 'escapes' his very own, solipsistic, intellectual world that, from the point of view of salvation, is unveiled as compensation, even for Anthony himself.[61] In his diary entries, he makes the reader anticipate the discrepancy between his self-image and his 'real' self. Many of Huxley's critics realize one of his most sustained thematic lines, the reconciliation of the different parts of the self: the body, the soul and the mind.[62] Miller is the inductor of Anthony's reconciliation, not creating a new Anthony but bringing to light a concealed but wholesome personality.[63]

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[60] Jerry Wasserman, "Huxley's Either/Or: The Case for *Eyeless in Gaza*," *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction*, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1980): 197.

[61] This technique of forming a narrative identity to fictively cover up traumatic events is well documented in narrative psychology. Cf. Sarbin about self-deception: Theodor R. Sarbin, "Az elbeszélés mint a lélektan tő-metaforája," in *Narratívák 5. – Narratív pszichológia*, ed. László János, Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 2001), 71-73. László János, *A történetek tudománya* (Budapest: ÚMK, 2005), 123. About Brian's suicide: "An understanding of Brian's suicide explains the extent to which Beavis's theory of personality is an attempt to elude the consciousness of his past actions." Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 149.

[62] John Atkins, *Aldous Huxley – A Literary Study* (London: John Calder, 1956), 151-152. "Spiritual blood-poisoning" if we repress the body as an influence of Lawrence: Ibid, 144. George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 62. Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 13-14.

[63] George Woodcock, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour – A Study of Aldous Huxley* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 202-203.

IV.

MULTIPLICITY AND DIVERSITY

The ending of EG was interpreted as a weakness by many critics.[64] The reader understands that Anthony's self-image was 'wrong' before his conversion and a 'true' self emerges from the story, as well as for Anthony himself after the revelatory meeting with Miller in Mexico. EG as a 'novel of ideas' finds its defining idea in the end - in pacifism and mysticism. Although, it was argued above that there is a deep structure hidden beneath the illusory fragmentation, this chapter conceives the structure not as the end of interpretation but another beginning. Therefore it has to be shown that the ending is 'implausible' for a purpose: the purpose is to make the reader accept certain insoluble tensions and to make the reader question the structure that his or her interpretation discovered in the text. One of the consequences of the implausibility is that the 'implied author' cannot be found in Miller or in the redeemed Anthony. First, the first-person singular, present-time voice of Anthony's diary is thus to be examined. Second, Anthony's revelation induced by Miller. Third, the style of the end, the last chapter of EG. It is argued that the 'deus ex machina' of Anthony's salvation is unbelievable because the reader has to realize that there is no finished personality. Literature is not only an artificial order, not only a structure in the text but also free play: in the end, the reader thinks that Anthony's true self is finally revealed: however, the true self can never be fully revealed.

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[64] George Woodcock says that the conversion and Miller's figure are implausible because meditational experience can not be put into words. Ibid, 205. Meckier says EG "settles for Anthony Beavis's final conception of all the different events of his life as an interrelated whole." Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 61. And also criticises Huxley for Miller being "shadowy" and "colorless" and EG turns out to be puzzle-solving. Ibid, 157. Cf. Miller and redemption as not lifelike: H. Szász Anna Mária, *Aldous Huxley világa* (Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1984). Anthony becoming the "all-engulfing consciousness": Pierre Vitoux, "Structure and Meaning in Aldous Huxley's *Eyeless in Gaza*," *The Yearbook of English Studies,* Vol. 2. (1972): 217.

Fourteen chapters of EG are written in the form of Anthony's diary. They are all from 1934, after the journey in Mexico and the meeting with Miller. They are mostly meditations on the self, on religion, on intellect, on peace, on theory and practice, on society, etc. They represent Anthony's changed state of mind and his break with his past that was ruled by his 'detachment'. Until the end, the reader does not really understand them, until then, reading the novel is accepting Anthony's former viewpoint, that is mediated to him or her through 'free indirect discourse'.[65] In the end, the diary entries claim their rightful position: they speak the authoritative voice of the present, the truth that declares the past a lie.

However, "[i]n order to tell the truth about a lie, one must tell a lie about the truth, both of which, as every philosopher knows, result in a lie."[66] Rephrased for our purposes, this means that Anthony's diary is not to be fully trusted. It is again a deceptive device that Huxley employs. The true self, the transformed Anthony that emerges in the end should be seen just as false, fictive and contingent as the one before. On a general level, every narrative identity escapes the true-false opposition of a correspondence view that relates the truth of statements to state of things in the world.[67] On the level of the EG's narrative, the voice of the diary is, despite the apparent authority, is the same old voice: Anthony does not prove in the novel that his latest theory of pacifism is not just a theory born out of compensation. In addition, Anthony, struggling with his former detachment, actually acts the same as before: tries to cut his past away from himself. Moreover, Anthony follows another pattern that is his heritage:

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[65] More in detail cf. Jeremy Hawthorne, *Studying the Novel* (London: Hodder Education, 5th ed. 2005), 97-99.

[66] Mark Currie, *About Time – Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 63. Mark Currie describes 'cure' of the truthful, reliable self-narration and says: "in the act of self-narration, the unreliability of the narrator merely takes a new form, remembering the past not as it was, but in the light of the present." Ibid.

[67] Many researchers realize the fictive status of any narrative identity, even the ones that seem the truest. Cf. "In the transformed self, when a person first openly acknowledged the negative impact of the difficult event on the self, this acknowledgment triggered the active analysis of the event that led to resolving it through seeing the self as positively transformed." Jennifer L. Pals, "Constructing the 'Springboard Effect': Causal Connections, Self-Making, and Growth Within the Life Story," in *Identity and Story – Creating Self in Narrative*, ed. Dan P. McAdams, Ruthellen Josselson, Amia Lieblich (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2006), 192. "our history constitutes a drama in which we are a leading character, and the meaning of this role is to be found only through the recollective and imaginative configuring of that history in autobiographical acts. In other words, in narrating the past we understand ourselves to be the implied subject generated by the narrative." Anthony Paul Kerby, *Narrative and the Self* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991),

he is again unable to claim responsibility, he claims it only through Miller as he echoes Miller's words. We are well aware of Anthony's irony towards the "Higher Life" of intellectuals: "All the fun of being a dictator without any risks or responsibilities." (EG, XIII, 138-139.) On the other hand, he himself is no more than a "Higher Lifer": he has not proved that he can transgress the boundary between theory and practice. Following Miller's pacifism is not equal to following his practice, his practice when "an angry young heckler" attacks him at a meeting and he does not fight back (EG, XXXII, 335-336.) Anthony's diary is ambiguous, to say the least.

This impression is strengthened by the character of Miller, the strange, pacifist doctor, Anthony and Mark meet in Mexico. This 'deus ex machina' is suspicious and Miller's character is not 'alive', Miller seems to be nothing more than Huxley's alter-ego in the novel but "[i]f Miller lacks credibility, Anthony's conclusions as his protégé must also be suspect. And since so much of the novel, including its structural logic, seems to depend on our accepting Anthony's final point of view, it would appear that Huxley could hardly allow critical detachment at the end."[68] After Miller cures Mark, they engage in a debate about European savages and the "anthropology" Miller intends to communicate by pacifism. This is the decisive moment of Anthony, Mark says: "'Huddle together among the cow-pats and watch the doctor trying his best anthropological bedside manner on General Goering. There'll be some hearty laughs.' 'In spite of which,' said Anthony, 'I think I shall go and make myself ridiculous with Miller.'" (EG, LI, 473.) This gesture, despite that it seems a glorious moment of Anthony's life, is a gesture of throwing away responsibility: instead of trying to figure out his identity for himself, Anthony adopts Miller's diagnosis of him that was given at their first meeting in Chapter XLIX and adopts his views as well. This seems to be EG's last word.

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[68] Jerry Wasserman, "Huxley's Either/Or: The Case for *Eyeless in Gaza,*" *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction*, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1980): 194.

On the contrary, the last chapter might be read differently. In Chapter LIV, Anthony has to face a threat alone: "If only Miller were here to give advice and encouragement! But Miller was in Glasgow." (EG, LIV, 496.) We have to notice, this is not a diary entry, on the whole timeline, this chapter is the latest, as well as in the book, which means that this is the last word. If it was true that EG's last word is ultimately the pacifism and mysticism of Miller, the chapter would be a diary entry and it would picture Anthony in the past tense, standing firm at the Battersea speech, offering no resistance to the punches of one of the "Group of Patriotic Englishmen" who threatened him. The last chapter is, in fact, in 'free indirect discourse' and it ends with: "Whatever it might be, he knew now that all would be well." (EG, LIV, 504.) The text ends here. Of course, all the readers can have guesses about what actually happened at the meeting or whether Anthony went there at all or not.[69] However, instead of guessing, it is important to ask the question: why did Huxley stop here if the ultimate message was pacifism and Anthony's conversion? What Meckier says is true, "[t]he whole novel has been a prelude to the course of action Beavis will now take and which the reader will comprehend because he knows how Beavis has developed"[70] – just not true in the way he intends it. The whole novel has been a prelude to something that is missing which makes the novel a prelude to uncertainty. And yes, the reader will comprehend uncertainty because he knows that Beavis has not yet reached an absolute identity. This is the satire of Huxley's egotistic eccentrics, proving that the counterpoint did not disappear in EG.[71]

Roland Barthes, Paul Ricoeur, Frank Kermode and many literary theorists would approve of our conclusions on the basis of modernist writing practices. Barthes says that the text is a

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[69] "But it resolves nothing at all. In the end we don't know whether he actually goes to speak at the pacifist meeting; or if he does, what might happen if he were physically attacked as had been threatened. Nor can we even guess for how long he might maintain his newly found faith." Ibid, 203.

[70] Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley – Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), 152.

[71] Ibid, 17. Cf. „The temporal self-distance of retrospect is a lie which reveals the truth, and this renders the truth a matter of temporality rather than simple presence." Mark Currie, *About Time – Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 64.

moment of peace, when the system, the ideologies dissolve.[72] Ricoeur argues that modernist literature created a new type of reader, the reader of suspicion who 'fights' the implied author and his views.[73] Frank Kermode says that „[o]ur business as moderns is to read in order to maximize plurality, not in order to understand secrets."[74] Even if there is a chance of getting to the core of a work, this core will turn out to be a riddle, the core itself will be problematic.[75] For our expectations as readers, this means that literary works upset them, which is the reason why they can keep us interested.[76] To subsume EG under 'the novel of the idea of pacifism' would be a great interpretative mistake driven by ideology and a mistake of intentional fallacy. We would deny plurality of interpretations and posit an unquestionable core.

As we are primarily concerned with the depiction of personality and construction of identity, we have to describe the consequences to them in detail. Following Peter T. F. Raggatt, we can say that Anthony's identity, the person who he is, is not finished in the end of the novel: "the life story could never be encompassed by a monologue."[77] "With this view narrative identity is more like a cacophony of competing interests or warring historians than it is like a nucleus with a single voice."[78] On the grounds of literary theory, this view of narrative identity is adequate with the Dostoevskean-Bakhtinian "polyphony".[79] Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan concludes her study with the statement that there are dangers if we intend to

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[72] Roland Barthes, *A szöveg öröme - irodalomelméleti írások* (Budapest: Osiris kiadó, 1998), 92-93.

[73] Paul Ricoeur, "A szöveg világa és az olvasó világa," in *Narratívák 2. – Történet és fikció*, ed. Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 1998), 18.

[74] Frank Kermode, *The Art of Telling – Essays on Fiction* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), 75.

[75] Ibid, 82.

[76] "The novel can be a criticism of common consciousness." Ibid, 64. And "by upsetting the ordinary balance of our naive expectations, is finding something out for us, something *real*." Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending – Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 18. Cf. "Once a world has been evoked and interpreters have relocated to it, orienting themselves to its canonical scripts or "givens," the procedures specific to narrative worldmaking require that the world be one in which those givens are called into question, jeopardized by events that are more or less radically noncanonical, more or less antithetic to the normal order of things." David Herman, *Basic Elements of Narrative* (Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 135-136.

[77] Peter T. F. Raggatt, "Multiplicity and Conflict in the Dialogical Self: A Life-Narrative Approach," in *Identity and Story – Creating Self in Narrative*, ed. Dan P. McAdams, Ruthellen Josselson, Amia Lieblich (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2006), 15.

[78] Ibid, 32.

[79] For a definition: Mihail Bahtyin, *Dosztojevszkij poétikájának problémái* (Budapest: Gond-Cura/Osiris Kiadó, 2001), 10-11.

fully integrate a personality into a higher narrative framework.[80] The 'free indirect discourse'
that Huxley ends the novel with is a perfect conclusion of a novel that only imitates the
authority of the present voice by quoting Anthony's diary, the novel is mainly polyphonic:
Huxley shows us the consciousness of many characters in every scene where they interact.[81]
The focalization is almost always character internal, the narrator character-bound.[82] Thus,
these narrative techniques support a suspicious reading, rather than one settling down at an
obvious ideology behind the text.

In addition, EG's extraordinary narrative configuration of time proves to be non-
transcendable, the reader cannot treat it only as a device that makes it harder to understand
Anthony's "*Bildung*". The uncertainty and indeterminacy of the ending makes us realize that
we have to question the structure again, this time not for a unifying principle but for an
explanation that helps us place this indeterminacy. "[T]he scenes belonging to different
periods are all mixed up, as if the novelist had shuffled his pack of fifty-four cards and was
now dealing them out one after the other as they turn up."[83] Although we argued that a
higher/deeper order is readable from the chaotic fragmentation, it seems now that we can not
transcend the fragmentation in the interpretative process.[84]

Since focalization and narrative configuration are, in a way, rhetorical techniques to reach
the reader,[85] it is probably a good idea to interrogate Huxley's rhetoric. In advance, we can

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[80] Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan, "The *I* that Tells Itself: A Bakhtinian Perspective on Narrative Identity,"
NARRATIVE, Vol. 16, No. 1. (January, 2008): 12.
[81] Mary Amberley's party in Chapters XIV, XVIII and XX is a central scene of polyphony.
[82] About focalization: Mieke Bal, *Narratology – Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (Toronto-Buffalo-
London: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 104-105. The narrator: Ibid, 122.
[83] Pierre Vitoux, "Structure and Meaning in Aldous Huxley's *Eyeless in Gaza*," *The Yearbook of English
Studies,* Vol. 2. (1972): 212.
[84] Cf. "Even postmodernist visions of the self, with their ostensible abandonment of fixed character ideals and
monolithic conceptions of identity, frequently posit quite definite ethical ends and images of the good life. One
even could go so far as to say that the postmodern style — in fiction, film, architecture and other visual arts, as
well as in "traditional" autobiographical narrative—is in itself arguing for a new image, indeed a new version, of
the good life." Mark Freeman and Jens Brockmeier, "Narrative integrity: Autobiographical identity and the
meaning of 'the good life'," in *Narrative and Identity – Studies in Autobiography, Self and Culture*, ed. Jens
Brockmeier, Donal Carbaugh (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: The John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001), 89.
[85] About focalization in this sense cf. Mieke Bal, *Narratology – Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*
(Toronto-Buffalo-London: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 50. Narrative making the reader to realize its

rely on Ricoeur's analysis: the rhetorical processes during which the author sacrifices his own position make the text look like a medium-less story. As the author disappears behind the implied author, the implied reader manifests in the real reader. The goal of the author is to make the reader identical with himself, to communicate his worldview as effectively as he can. This frightens the reader and causes a distance that is also the tension in which the reading takes place. The social effect of the work depends on the reader and on the level he or she is willing to make him or herself unreal in the reading process.[86]

We cannot discover traces of this rhetorical strategy in Miller, neither can we in the redeemed Anthony. Although, it is possible to argue against it on the basis of Huxley's life and later work, this is not the road which is taken here. In EG, in the novel itself, neither the Anthony of 1934 and 1935, nor Miller are capable to be the vehicle of the rhetoric described above. The strategies of the text that make Miller unconvincing and cast the shadow of a doubt on Anthony's latest intellectual position were addressed before. It is not the point that any reader will succeed to notice this, however, this paper wants to argue that the suspicious reader, made ready by modernism to engage the novel in a less naïve way, can and will search the text for a more believable and more convincing 'implied author' position than Miller and Anthony, a position that is worth communicating with. Many reasons can be considered. First, Anthony's journey is the reader's own and to make him a vehicle for the author as well would result in a premature supposition of unity between reader and author, therefore the reader will not have a 'proper' place to enter the novel's world. Second, Miller and his 'deus ex machina' entrance in 1934 come too 'late' to support the full implied author position. True, he is mentioned already in the second chapter, but only through Anthony's diary, which, as we have seen, is ambiguous. Third, Miller does not have any problem with his medium of

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artifice: Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction – An Introduction* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 221.

[86] Paul Ricoeur, "A szöveg világa és az olvasó világa," in *Narratívák 2. – Történet és fikció*, ed. Thomka Beáta (Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 1998), 15-41.

expression, he takes speech for granted, as does Anthony. However, an author should be fully aware of the problems concerning a text and literary communication. Huxley was certainly aware of it.

On the other hand, there is a much more subtle and much more effective position that is suitable for the implied author: Brian Foxe. Brian is a ghost-like entity who follows Anthony throughout his life, and the time-structure of the novel will not let us forget his death: his body is found in Chapter LII. He acts as the consciousness of Anthony. The relationship of Anthony and Brian can be seen as a paradigmatic instance of the relationship of the reader and the author. On a symbolic and allegoric level, Anthony's motherlessness and Brian's fatherlessness is interpretable to support this. Anthony's desire for his mother is allegorically the reader's desire for the author, which latter was theorized by Barthes.[87] Barthes also says that to be able to bear sincerity, we need false signs, which is the origin of literature: the fatherlessness of Brian is symbolically analogous with the decentered nature of narration and his stammering is the paradigm of literary communication, a communication that can only have effect, if it is able to delete its origin as a text.[88] Brian's stammering is both an effective device (the depiction of stammer is a strong stimulant of imagination) and a hindrance of communication which makes it analogous with the author's medium: the literary text. Literature and textuality open up a large space of interpretative possibilities and ambiguity and any author has to deal with a cultural and social symbol-system to create a world through language. This is both a way to affect the reader and a hindrance because the author can never be sure that the effect will be what he or she intended.

Moreover, Brian is the one who keeps the narrative in motion. Throughout the novel, he makes Anthony question himself long before the dog crashed onto Anthony's roof or he came in contact with Miller. The most horrifying aspect of the dog is that it reminds Anthony of

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[87] Roland Barthes, *A szöveg öröme - irodalomelméleti írások* (Budapest: Osiris kiadó, 1998), 90.
[88] Ibid, 24. In our view, the novel, the dialogue of Anthony and Brian is symbolically an 'orphan', and at the same time has 'mother/father-supplements'.

Brian's suicide: "Brian in the chalkpit, evolved by that salty smell of sun-warmed flesh, and again dead at the cliff's foot, among the flies - like that dog…" (EG, XII, 134.) Miller's theories can only influence Anthony because he became sensitive to it, listening to Brian's stammer, to Brian who could never really be a theorist: he could not even pronounce the topic ("syndicalism") he was going to give a speech on (EG, X, 95.) In addition, Brian tries to express the order, praised in the end by Anthony and Miller, in a much more profound way. While Miller and Anthony rely on love and peace in politics, they do not fully recognize what Brian does: that their theories depend upon the Christian tradition. Brian, with his love of birds, his commitment to realize the kingdom of God and his honesty, even in the matters which bother him (for example, Brian says after the Goggler Ledwidge-incident at Bulstrode: "'A-after all,' he went on and the blood came rushing back into his cheeks as he spoke, 'he i-isn't the…the o-only one.'" EG, VI, 65.) make him a perfect candidate for carrying the poetics of "Whole Truth". Brian's suicide is also the 'death of the author', his ghost, haunting Anthony, is the implied author that is never one with the biographical person.

The depiction of personality, therefore, shows a tension in EG, a tension, we might say, between order, unity, identity and chaos, multiplicity and diversity. Naturally, this tension plays part in an expanded framework as well: the questions of personality directed us to the questions of author and reader, literature and life, etc. The narrative and time-structure are perfectly adequate for expressing a tension like this: the interpretation goes from illusory order to deeper chaos, from illusory chaos to deeper order and then this strange hermeneutic circle starts again. Anthony seems like a detached intellectual but his detachment is unveiled as attachment and his intellectualism as compensation. In the next step his chaotic states seem to form a deeper order, a structure that is readable from the novel, from the repeated events which line up for a narrative that goes from "blindness to insight". However, this is not the last word: Anthony is not finished, EG does not complete his identity (to judge a life, we

know since Aristotle, we have to wait for death). The personality of Anthony only makes sense in the dialogue between him and Brian: this dialogue is constitutive both for the narrative identity of Anthony and for the reader's motive to question Anthony's identity. In the end, the only word that is pictured by the novel and in the novel as a breakthrough is a breakthrough of Brian to Anthony:

> "Brian suddenly laid his hand on Anthony's arm. The fingers travelled down the sleeve, then closed round the bare wrist; and thereafter, every time his stammer interposed itself between his feeling and its object, his grasp tightened in a spasm almost of desperation.
> 'I'm so t-terribly s-sorry about your m-mother,' […]." (EG, VI, 58.)

V.

CONCLUSION

> "*Somehow, good poems and novels—and*
>
> *autobiographies—seem to be able to speak*
>
> *truth.*"[89]

First, a modernist context was outlined in an attempt at placing EG in the modernist discourse. Questions of the relationship of life and art, narrative, time and experience were addressed. EG and its extraordinary narrative was seen as a valuable addition to the experiments with time that modernist novels embody.

In the second chapter, it was described how EG suggests a deep unity and order behind the fragmented and seemingly chaotic time-structure. The main instance of this unity is Anthony's personality, the way his theory of personality turned out to be compensation for his

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[89] Mark Freeman, "Rethinking the Fictive, Reclaiming the Real: Autobiography, Narrative Time, and the Burden of Truth," in *Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the Brain*, ed. Gary D. Fireman, Ted E. McVay, Jr., Owen J. Flanagan (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 127.

guilt and his detachment turned out to be attachment. However, EG shows that narrative identity and a unity of personality are reachable and Anthony seems to discover this in the end.

The third chapter was an attempt at a more suspicious reading, a reading that does not take Anthony's redemption, Miller's character and the ending for granted. Many problematic aspects were examined. On the other hand, the problems were not exclusively in focus: accepting the problems, a new 'implied author' position was found which, according to our thesis, is more suitable to express the rhetoric of the implied author. The depiction of personality, the construction of it was seen as primarily determined by this relationship and, consequently, the narrative and time-structure were as well seen according to this.

All in all, the paper argued that Huxley's novel is an extraordinary instance of and experiment with narrative, time-structure and thus with the depiction of personality. It was also shown that there is a reading that does not have to emphasize Huxley's pacifism and mysticism and interpret a novel in their context. EG is seen sometimes as a *Bildungsroman* that settles for the protagonist's, Anthony Beavis's final conception. This paper, instead, tried to integrate this final conception into a self-conscious artistic project that sets the relationship of Anthony Beavis and Brian Foxe into a central position, being an allegory of the relationship of reader and author and therefore it questions the possibilities of works of literature and their effects on readers.

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